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A B S T R A C T
This study describes the phases of quasi-marketization of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area’s bus services and
analyzes the ﬁnancial and structural consequences for purchasers and providers. Qualitative data was collected
through interviews, a focus group, and extensive document reviews, while the quantitative data was received
from a sub-regional authority and from the Finnish Patent and Registration Oﬃce’s database. According to our
ﬁndings, even if the clear purchaser-provider split was a diﬃcult and long process, the threat of competition and
particularly the introduction of tendering resulted in reductions in contract prices. Bus operators started to
compete for market shares and over the years of the quasi-market they lost their proﬁtability and consumed their
own assets. The quasi-market format could not provide equal terms of competition between municipal and
private operators, resulting in all municipal and many small operators disappearing from the market. The market
structure became more concentrated as the number of purchasers and providers fell. The quasi-market frame-
work was initiated by the central government and it has been instrumental for local political decision-makers to
increase the responsiveness of operators through competitive contracting.
1. Introduction
A quasi-market is a planned and regulated market of public services
through which public authorities, as collective consumption units, act
as purchasers by organizing competitive tendering between public and
private service producers who compete to win a contract from the au-
thorities. Quasi-marketization refers not only to the process of a public
service industry’s de- or reregulation, but also to core operational
processes, including separating purchasers and providers, specifying
collectively needed services, and introducing competition (Le Grand,
1991; Kähkönen, 2010). However, according to some studies (Curtice
and Fraser, 2000; O’Flynn and Alford, 2008), the purchaser-provider
split might be more diﬃcult to achieve in practice than is commonly
assumed.
This empirical study demonstrates that achieving a purchaser-pro-
vider split and competitive neutrality in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area
proved to be very challenging.
The study reviews the events and summarizes the phases of quasi-
marketization of local and sub-regional bus services of Helsinki
Metropolitan Area. The quasi-market developments are analyzed using
the perspectives of local public policies and competitive conditions in a
quasi-market. As several previous studies (Hilke, 1992; Kennedy, 1995;
Bekken et al., 2006; Veeneman and van de Velde, 2014) have indicated
that the introduction of competition has delivered immediate savings in
bus services, in this study, instead of authorities’ budgetary savings the
main focus is on the analyses of bus operators’ ﬁnancial standing.
The empirical research questions are the following: How has quasi-
marketization changed organizational and market structures and what
have been the short-term ﬁnancial impacts on the purchasers and the
long-term ﬁnancial impacts on the providers? Furthermore, the theo-
retical purpose of the study is to reﬂect on our empirical observations in
order to contribute to conceptual discussions about the nature of quasi-
market formation and the challenges in urban bus services.
The study summarizes regulatory changes made in the early 1990s,
reviews the structural changes in the quasi-market from 1993 to 2015,
and analyzes the ﬁnancial implications for bus operators from 1998 to
2014. The empirical contribution of the study is that it is capable of
demonstrating somewhat surprising long-term changes. The organiza-
tional arrangements of the quasi-market were unstable and, in the end,
the city governments were required to give up both their purchasing
and provision roles. Municipal operators were privatized and most of
the smaller bus operators have been driven out of the market by the
competition. In addition, the remaining operators have faced severe
ﬁnancial diﬃculties and their owners have been forced to allocate more
capital to bus operators by issuing new equity as well as granting them
subordinated loans.
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Regarding this article’s structure, we ﬁrst discuss our methodology,
followed by our analytical framework by clarifying the basic proposi-
tions of the quasi-market concept. After this, we begin to cover our
ﬁndings by outlining the regulatory reforms and quasi-marketization
events. We then review the structural impacts of quasi-marketization,
early-stage changes of contract prices, and ﬁnancial eﬀects on bus op-
erators. At the end of the empirical section, we analyze the relationship
between operators’ market share weighted ﬁnancial ratios and average
bidders per competitive rounds. In the ﬁrst part of the discussion sec-
tion, we summarize our empirical ﬁndings and assess them by con-
sidering how they ﬁt in with previous bus studies. In the second part of
our discussion, we sum up our remarks about quasi-market formation in
the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. The study closes with our conclusions
and public policy recommendations.
2. Materials and methods
This paper presents analysis and ﬁndings from a long-term and
multi-method empirical study. Qualitative data was collected through a
focus group, semi-structured interviews, the reviews of audit reports,
law drafting materials, legal cases, newspaper articles, and government
documents. The focus group was convened in 2001–2002, when the
ﬁnal negotiated contracts were ending and being replaced by compe-
tition-based contracts. The focus group represented a mix of interests,
including representatives from the City of Helsinki, the sub-regional
authority, the Employers’ Federation of Road Transport, the Trade
Union for the Public and Welfare Sectors, the Transport Workers’
Union, and the Federation of Public and Private Sector Employees. The
interviewees were selected on the basis of the focus group’s re-
commendations and they were top or expert oﬃcials from service
purchasing, service producing, or lobbying organizations. The face-to-
face interviews lasted from one to one-and-a-half hours, and they were
tape-recorded and transcribed for analysis. The analyzed newspaper
articles were published in 1994–2015, and the audit reports in
2005–2009.
The quantitative data covers the bus operators’ annual ﬁnancial
statements and Helsinki Region Transport (HSL) Statistics. We focus on
the period 1998–2014 because a new Finnish Accounting
Standard—based on the fourth and seventh EU company law directi-
ves—was being enacted in December 1997. Bus operators’ ﬁnancial
statements were collected from the Finnish Patent and Registration
Oﬃce’s database and data on market shares and numbers of bids were
received from the sub-regional authority.
Our quantitative analyses detect long-term developments in bus
operators’ ﬁnancial performance. It is worth noting that previous stu-
dies have not reported long-term ﬁndings indicating—or oﬀered a de-
tailed picture of—how bus operators manage their ﬁnances in the new
competitive environment. We conducted this analysis by reviewing the
bus operators’ annual reports, following the analysis guidelines pro-
vided by the Finnish Committee for Corporate Analysis.
3. Analytical framework
Quasi-marketization aims to introduce and integrate certain types of
market mechanisms into the system of public services; these include
less restricted market entry, open public procurements, and dynamic
pricing via periodically recurring competitive bidding (Hansen and
Lindholst, 2016). The theory of quasi-markets suggests that a quasi-
market helps to enhance the responsiveness of public and private ser-
vice providers and to share risks associated with operations (Le Grand,
1991; Raftery et al., 1996; Le Grand et al., 1993).
The key ideas of quasi-market theory can be clariﬁed by the terms of
agency theory, as the latter is similarly based on the necessities and
advantages of specialization that the principal brings along deﬁned
aims and ﬁnancial resources, while the agent focuses on operational
performance (Luchman and Cunliﬀe, 2013). A principal needs to ﬁnd
an agent as a specialist in professional services to carry out given as-
signments. We illustrate this by using a four-fold typology of organizing
public services, as presented in Fig. 1.
In the classic case of public administration (Type I), illustrated in
Fig. 1, the government sets up a public agency to carry out public duties
with a hierarchy of settings. Type II is a rarer case in which some public
duties are given to private sector agents via top-down arrangements
(i.e. typically via legal or license obligations) (Lane, 1997).
Instead of a pure top-down relationship, the government may create
a contractual relationship with the public or private service agent
(Types III and IV). If the government makes a contract with a public
agent, it is an example of contracting in (Type III), whereas a con-
tractual relationship with a private agent is contracting out (Type IV)
(Valkama et al., 2013). The contractual relationships can be based on
(i) mutual negotiations or (ii) competition. Quasi-market competition
typically refers to competition in a market via competitive tendering of
non-proﬁt and pro-proﬁt service providers through making the lowest
bids or the most economically advantageous tenders, whereas compe-
tition for a market refers to the struggle to create a new market
(Geroski, 2003).
Splitting purchasers and providers delegates some decision-making
duties to operative units, increasing their autonomy, and allowing
purchasers—including policymakers—to concentrate on more strategic
issues, while service providers can focus on technical issues of service
delivery (Harden, 1992; O’Flynn and Alford, 2008). Purchasers and
providers are able to improve their skills and eﬃciencies as they can
specialize in their core function. However, the separated quasi-market
parties can also face problems, such as a lack of conﬁdence, conﬂicts of
interest, and disagreements over contractual interpretations
(Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther, 2005).
The quasi-market format’s abstract dimensions can be analyzed
from the perspectives of institutional, organizational, spatial, and
temporal factors (Mügge, 2011; Breslau, 2013). The institutional factors
refer to ﬁnancial systems and legal norms, even though the quasi-
market format’s fundamental institutional conditions depend primarily
on legitimacy issues. The organizational aspect refers to the stability of
purchaser-provider separation, as well as the market players’ characters
and emergence. Spatial issues of a local quasi-market focus on the
territorial platform’s sustainability and eﬀectiveness, how scalable the
territorial based demand functions and supply capacities are, how the
quasi-market is capable of generating indirect eﬀects beyond the lo-
cality, and how the quasi-market can be replicated in other locations.
Temporal factors refer to the rapidity and recurrence of a quasi-mar-
ket’s core processes.
Hierarchical
Contractual
Nature of 
relationships
between 
principal and 
agents
Public Private
Bus service agents
IV
II
III
I
Fig. 1. Generic options for organizing public services (adapted from Lane,
1997).
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4. Research ﬁndings
4.1. Overview of Helsinki metropolitan bus services’ quasi-marketization
In the 1980s, the metropolitan area bus services’ regulatory fra-
mework could be characterized as an era of strictly regulated and non-
competitive markets. In 1991, a new public transport law made it
legally possible to introduce competition into public bus service pro-
vision in Finland (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 2003).
Second, the restrictions on foreign ownership of enterprises were re-
moved from company law and related legislation in 1993 (Kiander and
Romppanen, 2005). Third, the ﬁrst public procurement law came into
eﬀect in 1994, including the introduction of open, transparent, and fair
competitive bidding in public procurements (HE, 1992). Around the
same time, the public transport law was changed by giving up the
means-tested (i.e. including an investigation of a service need) regular
bus service licenses given by state authorities in such cases, where
municipalities decided to fund local bus services on a contractual basis
(HE, 1994). These regulatory developments were framed by the Eur-
opeanization of Finland’s national economy, particularly through Fin-
land’s membership of the European Economic Area in 1994 and the
European Union (EU) in 1995.
The public procurement law forced the sub-regional authority of the
Helsinki Metropolitan Area to start competitive tendering of sub-re-
gional bus services (i.e., services between diﬀerent municipal jurisdic-
tions of the sub-region) because the negotiated contracts were not
lawful anymore and the authority did not have internal operators. The
sub-regional authority saw it also as an opportunity to cut service costs
as it believed that the negotiated contracts were too expensive. The
authority initiated plans to use three- and possibly ﬁve-year contracts
and published its ﬁrst call for bids in 1994 (Seutuliikenteen kilpai-
luttaminen, 1991; Ministry of Transport and Communications, 2003;
Liikennevirasto, 2012).
The legal position of the City of Helsinki was diﬀerent in the way
that it organized local bus services through internal and external op-
erators. The internal operators included both an internal unit (i.e.,
municipal transport enterprise) and legally an external (i.e., limited
company) bus operators. Both of these were considered as in-house
units in terms of public procurement regulation. The requirement to
introduce competitive tendering applied only to such contracts that the
City of Helsinki had made with externally owned operators. However,
the City of Helsinki also wanted to make budgetary savings and made a
local choice to quasi-marketize local bus services through the in-
troduction of a purchaser-provider split and competitive tendering in
1997. Fig. 2 illustrates the main events that took place in the creation of
the bus services market in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the range of changes in the public and private
governance of the metropolitan area’s bus services, including changes
in organizational forms, amalgamations of procurement activities, and
corporate acquisitions. Furthermore, key industrial and competition
disputes are highlighted in the timeline.
4.2. Structural impacts of quasi-marketization
Separating purchasers and providers through an organizational split
turned out to be a tangled, multi-phased, and painful process in
Helsinki. Before 1995, the internal unit of the City of Helsinki delivered
not only bus services but also tram and underground services. However,
this kind of organizational solution did not ﬁt the context of the in-
dustry’s quasi-market since the municipal enterprise dispensed au-
tonomy and transparency. For example, the bus services did not have
their own ﬁnancial accounts. City councillors had to separate the pro-
duction of municipal bus services from other municipal transport ser-
vices and grant an internal semi-autonomous position by creating a
diﬀerentiated internal bus unit in 1995 (Valkama and Flinkkilä, 2003).
However, the new organizational form (i.e., the diﬀerentiated in-
ternal bus enterprise) provided some managerial autonomy to the
municipal bus unit, but it proved to be a short-lived organizational
model. The private bus operators were critical and argued, for example,
that the municipal bus enterprise was not able to go bankrupt causing a
lack of conﬁdence characterized the relationship between the City of
Helsinki and the bus industry interest group. The Finnish Bus and Coach
Association clearly pointed out that the internal bus enterprise was too
closely connected with the purchasing functions of the city and insisted
that the unit had to be corporatized to equalize governance terms for all
companies who operate in the metropolitan area (Helsingin Sanomat,
2004). Gradually, the city councillors agreed with external pressures
and the internal enterprise was externalized when it was corporatized
and merged at the beginning of 2005. However, even this separation
between the municipal purchaser and provider proved to be vulnerable
to conﬂicts, as a private operator complained about illegal municipal
aid being awarded to the merged limited company (Helsingin kaupunki,
2015). Finally, approximately ten years later, the city government
decided to sell the municipal bus operator to a private bus company.
Fig. 3 summarizes the organizational changes, illustrating both the slow
implementation of the purchaser-provider split and privatization mea-
sures.
In 1993, before competitive tendering was introduced, the largest
bus operator had a 25 per cent market share with a total of 13 operators
(Liikennevirasto, 2012). In the competitive quasi-market, small com-
panies began to lose their market share, and the four largest operators
were able to grow (see Table 1), with these changes being partly caused
by acquisitions. The interviewed experts believed the tendered targets
(i.e., the packages of bus routes) may have favored incumbent and
larger operators. The external and especially poorly capitalized or small
rural operators had not taken the trouble to submit serious, risk-taking
bids (Valkama and Flinkkilä, 2003). During the two decades that fol-
lowed the introduction of competitive tendering, only one new bus
operator has been able to enter and become established in the market
without a preceding privatization move. This newcomer was a sub-
sidiary company of the state-owned railway corporation, which bought
one of the existing private operators in 2005. The focus group discus-
sions outlined the fact that incumbent market players have enjoyed
some limited economies of scale. The restricted availability of urban
rental depots has been a particular factor explaining why existing op-
erators have been able to defend and expand their market shares
(Kilpailuvirasto, 2007; Järviluoma, 2017).
Systematic competitive bidding created a more challenging en-
vironment to operate in and run a proﬁtable bus business than when
operators’ contract rewards were based on negotiations. Table 2 de-
monstrates how private operators tried to cope with the competitive
quasi-market by changing their internal cost structures by replacing
their own buses with leased buses.
Prior to the beginning of quasi-marketization, there were four pro-
curing public authorities in the area. Three city governments (i.e.,
Helsinki, Espoo, and Vantaa) procured local bus services, while the sub-
regional authority procured bus services between diﬀerent jurisdictions
of the metropolitan area, ﬁrst through negotiated contracts and later
through competitive tendering (Valkama and Flinkkilä, 2003).
At the beginning of the quasi-market, the joint municipal authority
was a multi-service organization managing sub-regional public bus
transport, municipal waste management, and air pollution control.
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However, the authority was transformed in 2010 by excluding non-
public transport services from its operations and focusing on all kinds of
urban public transport services; namely, urban buses, as well as trams,
underground and commuter train services, and ferries (HE, 2009).
During the years of quasi-marketization, the sub-regional authority
was able to standardize the contract management of local and sub-
regional bus services, as well as to increase their integration with the
other means of public transportation. This was possible because local
governments gave up their operative duties of public procurement of
local bus operations, transferring the management of competitive ten-
dering to the transformed (i.e., new) sub-regional authority, making it
the single principal authority organizing competitive tendering
City of Helsinki started to procure local bus services in the 
1970s, and a new sub-regional authority started to procure 
regional bus services in 1986. Procurements were done via 
negotiated contracts.
1986
1993
1994The first law on public procurements and changes in the public 
transport law came into effect and the regional authority started 
gradually competitive tendering in 1994. A municipal operator (i.e. 
limited company) was the first winner and it got a 3-year contract. 
Bus companies owned by the cities of Espoo and 
Vantaa were sold to foreign companies before the first 
competitive tendering was introduced.
1995
A strike by transport workers demanding 
better job security in 1996.
The City of Helsinki created a semi-autonomous bus 
enterprise via an intra-organizational arrangement in 
1995.
1996
The City of Helsinki started gradually competitive tendering of 
local bus services in the capital in 1997.
The City of Espoo started competitive tendering and renewed all 
local contracts in 1998. 
The City of Vantaa started competitive tendering and renewed all 
local contracts in 1999. 
1997
A strike by transport workers occurred and a
special collective agreement was signed. An 
unsuccessful complaint about predatory 
pricing was submitted to the Finnish 
Competition Authority. 
1998
1999
2001
The City of Helsinki accomplished its long transitional period and 
replaced its final negotiated contract with a competition-based 
contract in 2002.
2004The City of Helsinki decided to corporatize its bus unit and merge it 
with the city-owned bus operator (i.e., a limited company).
A new law on public transportation allowing competition was 
introduced in 1991.
Restrictions on foreign ownership of enterprises were removed 
from company law in 1993.
Two strikes by transport workers occurred in 2004: 1) 
against corporatization and 2) against temporary and 
part-time job contracts.
Timeline
2006
A strike by transport workers against 
part-time work.
2010The municipalities established a new joint procurement authority (Helsinki Regional Transport Authority) and the procurement 
duties of the City of Helsinki were merged with the new sub-
regional authority.
Policy and procurements Operators 
A strike by bus drivers against personnel 
policy and job shifts.
2014
2013
2012
2011
The municipality of Sipoo joined the Helsinki Regional Transport 
Authority as a new member.
The City of Kerava (2006) and the municipality of Kirkkonummi 
(2008) entered into a contract with the sub-regional authority.
Finland joined the European Union in 1995.
2015The city council of Helsinki authorized privatization of the 
municipal bus company in 2015.
A new bill suggesting a new regulatory framework was issued 
by the national government.
A limited strike by bus drivers.
2005
The cities of Espoo, Vantaa, and Kauniainen relinquished local 
procurements to the sub regional authority.
A state-owned operator entered into the 
market via an acquisition.
2016 A family-owned private bus company took 
over the former municipal operator.
A complaint about the City of Helsinki was 
filed by a private bus operator to the 
European Commission.
A bankruptcy of a small private operator with 
140 workers.
1991
Gradually, 7-year contracts have replaced 3-year and 5-year 
contracts.
All sub-regional contracts of the operators were 
replaced by competition-based contracts in 1997 as the 
sub-regional authority finalized its first rounds of 
competitive tendering.
The sub-regional authority started to plan the 
competition-based contracts in 1991 and operators 
claimed for three to ten year contracts to be applied.
A strike by transport workers blaming amongst other 
things bad work atmosphere in 2000.
 
Fig. 2. The main events of the development of sub-regional and local bus service quasi-markets in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.
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(Liikennevirasto, 2012; HE, 2009). The City of Helsinki wanted to
corporatize the sub-regional authority, which is a public law entity with
municipalities as its only legally acknowledged members, but other
local authorities rejected this suggestion. The sub-regional authority
has expanded over the last 20 years to include three new member
municipalities, doubling its geographical area, as illustrated in Table 3.
The current regulatory framework of the quasi-market is based on
the national legislation harmonizing with the European Parliament’s
and the European Council’s regulations on public passenger transport
services by rail and by road, which were issued in 2007. The EU
Regulations (Regulation [EC] 1370/2007) deﬁne how public autho-
rities are allowed to deﬁne the nature and extent of public service ob-
ligations in public bus services and so allow the authorities to organize
more numerous, higher quality, and lower cost bus services than free
markets could deliver. However, fairly recently, the Finnish central
government (i.e., a coalition government of center, conservative, and
populist parties) introduced a new bill proposing a new regulatory
framework designed to improve operational preconditions for the free-
market-based bus transport industry promoting economic liberalization
Fig. 3. Developments in the organizational and contractual systems between bus operators and the public authorities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Municipally
owned operators are marked by * and private companies operating under contracts to municipalities are marked by #.
Table 1
Market share development and the number of procurement authorities (CT= competitive tendering) (Valkama and Flinkkilä 2003; Liikennevirasto, 2012; Rantanen
2017).
Year
Before CT After the introduction of CT
1994 2003 2005 2011 2013 2015
Market share of the largest bus operator 25% 32% 42% 31% 31% 37%
Market share of the four largest bus operators 82% 93% 96% 91% 95% 94%
Total number of operators 13 8 8 8 9 7
Market concentration measured by Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index 0.195 0.244 0.308 0.242 0.253 0.250
Total number of procurement units 4 authorities 4 authorities 2 authorities 1 authority 1 authority 1 authority
Table 2
Largest operators leasing liabilities scaled by total asset.
Year Municipal Private
1998 0.00% 0.71%
1999 0.00% 4.17%
2000 0.00% 8.65%
2001 0.00% 17.09%
2002 0.00% 31.16%
2003 0.00% 41.27%
2004 0.00% 47.96%
2005 4.44% 41.62%
2006 3.73% 55.75%
2007 2.55% 45.74%
2008 1.20% 30.79%
2009 0.06% 51.19%
2010 0.05% 67.17%
2011 0.03% 57.79%
2012 0.05% 85.19%
2013 0.03% 70.02%
2014 0.01% 71.21%
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of the metropolitan bus services (HE, 2016). The sub-regional authority
believes that if the bill is accepted by the legislature, any operator could
enter the market and challenge publicly funded services in the future
(Helsingin seudun liikenne, 2016).
4.3. Early-stage reductions of contract prices
The threat of competition was obvious after the new public trans-
port law made it legally possible to introduce competition in 1991.
Local authorities utilized this situation by negotiating some contract
discounts before they started actual competitive tendering. Table 4
presents the reported percentual contract savings both through the
negotiated contracts under the threat of competition and the ﬁrst
competitive tendering. The introduction of the ﬁrst calls for bids caused
some extra transaction costs for the local authorities, but once the
processes became routine, these costs shrank considerably. According
to an interview with a top civil servant with the sub-regional authority,
the transaction costs for the competition-based procurements did not
play a signiﬁcant role (Valkama and Flinkkilä, 2003).
The stakeholder groups’ representatives considered the reported
percentual savings reliable, and none of the interviewees or focus group
members challenged them. However, the interviewees believed the
substantial decline in the ﬁrst tendered prices by the sub-regional au-
thority in 1994 may have been due to cross-subsidization from nego-
tiated contracts because only a small share (i.e., 15 per cent) of the
regional services was put under the ﬁrst competitive tendering, en-
abling the providers to use proﬁts from the negotiated contracts as
cross-subsidies to support very low tenders (Valkama and Flinkkilä,
2003).
In our study, we found that comprehensive and coherent data on
long-term budgetary savings in money and detailed data on quality
changes was not available. For example, management accounting of
local authorities was not regulated, letting them carry out cost ac-
counting independently without uniﬁed standards (Helin and Valkama,
1995).
4.4. Financial development of bus operators
To understand the ﬁnancial development of bus operators following
the implementation of competitive tendering, we conducted a ratio
analysis for the largest bus operators in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area
over the 17-year period between 1998 and 2014. Our dataset from 1998
to 2004 comprises four operators: Concordia Bus Finland, Veolia
Transport Finland, HKL Bussiliikenne, and Suomen Turistiauto.
However, at the end of 2004, the City of Helsinki decided to merge the
two bus operators that it held a majority of shares in, i.e., HKL
Bussiliikenne and Suomen Turistiauto. The new operator, Helsingin
Bussiliikenne, commenced operations on January 1, 2005. Therefore,
between 2005 and 2014, our dataset consists of three bus operators.
The bus operators’ ﬁnancial ratios are reported in Table 5 panel A.
The ratios are arrived at as follows. First, we calculated individual key
ﬁgures of proﬁtability (EBITDA, ROE) and leverage (E/A, D/E) for each
bus operator over the period 1998–2014. We then calculated operators’
market share weighted mean values for each annual ratio. These ratios
provided information about proﬁtability (EBITDA, ROE) and leverage
(E/A, D/E).
The development of bus operators’ proﬁtability has been very poor.
The weak development of shareholders’ equity ratio (ROE) signiﬁes that
bus operators have consumed their own equity, and the proportional
share of debt (D/E) has risen on their balance sheets. Moreover the
largest bus operators’ average equity ratio (E/A) weakened dramati-
cally from 41.4% in 1998 to below zero in 2014.1 At the same time,
Table 5 panel B shows that the average number of kilometers in ten-
dering bus traﬃc (KM) has increased from 53,360 to 94,529 million
kilometers between 1998 and 2014. During the same period, however,
the average number of bidders per competitive round (BIDDERS) has
dropped from 4.29 to 3.35. This development is consistent with Tinnilä
and Kallio (2017) who report a reduction in bidders as well as the
number of bus operators in the Finnish metropolitan area.
The ﬁgures in Table 5 are consistent with a report by the Finnish
Government (HE, 2009) which states that bus operators’ proﬁtability in
the Helsinki Metropolitan Area is signiﬁcantly below the average for
bus operators in Finland. Both private and public sector owners had to
allocate new working capital (i.e., share capital and/or subordinated
loans) to their bus companies in order to enable the operators to aﬂoat.
It is important to note that, especially for large bus operators, an exit
from the markets generates large losses mainly due to heavy speciﬁc
investment. Speciﬁc large assets like equipment and depots prevent bus
operators’ capability to adapt to any market changes. It means that if a
bus operator loses a public procurement tender, it cannot oﬀer the same
service for local business or directly to consumers.
4.5. Relationship with bus operators’ ﬁnancial ratios and competitive
statistics
The Pearson and Spearman bivariate correlations between opera-
tors’ ﬁnancial ratios and competitive tendering statistics are reported in
Table 6. Most of these correlations are high in absolute value, and
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations are very similar.
We observed that bidders per round tend to be associated positively
and in a statistically signiﬁcant manner with operators’ proﬁtability
measured by EBITDA (Spearman 0.835, Pearson 0.687), and ROE
(Spearman 0.583, Pearson 0.561). Moreover, the relationship between
operators’ equity ratio (E/A) and the number of bidders per round
seems to be positive (Spearman 0.674, Pearson 0.613) and statistically
signiﬁcant. Finally, the level of bidders per round tends to have a ne-
gative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship with the proportion of
Table 3
Changes of the sub-regional authority.
In 1994, when competitive tendering was started In 2015, after 20 years of experience with the
competitive quasi-market
Name of the authority The Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council Helsinki Regional Transport Authority
Organizational form A multipurpose, sub-regional public authority A single-purpose public authority for an extended sub-
region
Services (i.e., ﬁelds of operation) Municipal waste management, sub-regional public bus
transport, air pollution protection
Sub-regional and local public transport
The member municipalities of the authority Espoo, Helsinki, Kauniainen, and Vantaa Espoo, Helsinki, Kauniainen, Kerava, Kirkkonummi,
Sipoo, and Vantaa
Number of residents in the jurisdiction of the joint
municipal authority
874,953 on December 31, 1994 1,201,831 on January 31, 2015
Land surface area 743.1 square kilometers 1506.75 square kilometers
1 The only exception in this decreasing trend is 2006 when shareholders allocate a total
of over 35 million euros capital to bus operators. That operation temporarily increased
operators’ E/A-ratio and decreased D/E ratio.
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debt (D/E) in operators’ capital structure (Spearman −0.728, Pearson
−0.744).
We observed that the share of tendering tends to be associated in a
negatively and statistically signiﬁcant manner with operators’ proﬁt-
ability measured by EBITDA (Spearman−0.598, Pearson−0.900) and
ROE (Spearman−0.544, Pearson−0.546). Moreover, the relationship
between operators’ equity ratio (E/A) and share of tendering seems to
be negative (Spearman −0.613, Pearson −0.874) and statistically
signiﬁcant. Finally, the share of tendering seems to have a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant relationship with the proportion of debt (D/E) in
operators’ capital structure (Spearman 0.794, Pearson 0.677).
5. Discussion
5.1. Financial and structural impacts
Fig. 4 summarizes the main phases of the quasi-marketization of the
Helsinki Metropolitan Area from the perspectives of the local public
policies. To begin with, deregulation opened up an avenue to extend
local considerations and choices in public bus operations, but the life-
cycle of the quasi-market may move on through the suggested further
deregulation in the near future. The national government plans to
eliminate the priority position of publicly procured bus services, which
would limit the scope of the local service policies.
The introduction of the legal framework of a quasi-market helped
the City of Helsinki and the sub-regional authority to negotiate the
small reductions (i.e., from 0.5% to 5.0%) of contract prices by utilizing
the threat of competition, but remarkable reductions (i.e. from 17.5%
to 33.2%) of contract prices were achieved via the ﬁrst calls for bids
(Valkama and Flinkkilä, 2003; Ministry of Transport and
Communications, 2003). These observations are consistent with the
current literature’s ﬁndings that the introduction of competitive ten-
dering has delivered savings in many cities (cf. Hensher and Wallis,
2005; Walters and Jansson, 2008; Wallis and Bray, 2014).
On the other hand, a highly competitive quasi-market has drama-
tically and long-lastingly weakened bus operators’ ﬁnancial position.
Bus operators have consumed their equity and the proportional share of
debts has risen on their balance sheets. These results are in line with
ﬁndings from the Swedish markets (Ernst and Young, 2013). According
to the Finnish transport agency (Liikennevirasto, 2012), the remaining
operators are trying to cut costs all the time in order to survive because
they cannot ﬁnd alternative and proﬁtable markets in the country. We
can also point out that an exit from the quasi-market and entry into a
new market would cause extra switching costs.
After more than 20 years of competition, the quasi-market’s com-
petitive structure is reasonable, but the largest operator has a market
share of 34 per cent. To begin with, the quasi-market structure was an
oligopsony, since there were a few purchasing authorities and many
providers. Nowadays, it is reminiscent of a partial monopsony, as there
is only one procurement body left and the four largest bus operators
have increased their combined market share to 95 per cent. The
dominant operators have been able to grow their market shares, espe-
cially through mergers. However, price competition between bus op-
erators has been intense, given the radical and long-term deterioration
of their ﬁnancial performance and earning power. As only one pur-
chasing unit remains in the quasi-market, it is capable of setting the
pricing mechanism to ensure that their objectives for public transport
are reﬂected in tenders (e.g. the extent of transfer of patronage risk and
the securing of certain qualities of service) in the whole sub-region.
Municipal operators have survived the competition in many central
European cities (Zatti, 2012). However, in this case, municipal opera-
tors were dropped from the quasi-market, as happened in many other
large Nordic cities (Hansson, 2011). In the end, the municipal opera-
tors’ disappearance resulted from the local political choices to apply
privatization policies. Our ﬁnancial statement and audit report analyses
suggest that municipal operators had inﬂexible cost structures and wereTa
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thus unable to reduce their costs as eﬀectively as the private operators.
First, the private operators change some of their ﬁxed costs to variable
costs by replacing their own buses with leased buses. Second, the col-
lective agreement of the municipal sector included a more rigid shift
system than the collective agreement of the private sector (Salomaa,
2015).
Bailey (1999) has argued that bus services are very suitable public
goods for competitive markets since the overall lack of economies of
scale typically leads to pluralism in service provision, but Cambini and
Filippini (2003) have claimed that the industry has some economies of
scale. Our ﬁndings modestly support the idea of economies of scale in
urban bus services. We found that market entry has been diﬃcult, and
the interviewees pointed out that the urban depot holdings, along with
the discounts for bulk purchases of buses, seem to provide noteworthy
scale beneﬁts.
5.2. Quasi-market formation
The organizational dimension of the quasi-market format has been
problematic in the studied case. The City of Helsinki had a demanding
dual role in the quasi-market as it was purchasing local bus services
and, at the same time, selling both local and sub-regional bus services.
It took many years for the city councillors to organize a clear purchaser-
provider split through the changes of organizational forms of municipal
bus service operations. First, the city diﬀerentiated (i.e., separated) its
internal bus operator from the unit of municipal tram and subway
services in 1995. Second, the internal bus operator was reorganized by
corporatizing it and establishing a new municipal limited company in
2005. Our ﬁndings provide a plausible reason to cast doubt on the or-
ganizational axiom of quasi-market theorization, according to which
both public law (i.e., not-for proﬁt) and private law (i.e., for-proﬁt)
operators are suitable organizational forms in competition for the same
service contracts. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that they do not operate on
equal terms. For example, internal operators of municipalities cannot
go bankrupt like private law operators, they cannot collect capital ﬁ-
nancing on equal terms, and they have to follow diﬀerent collective
agreements.
Considering a quasi-market’s spatial aspect, the studied quasi-
market with negotiated contracts was initially a local concept in
Helsinki. Its geographical territory became larger, ﬁrst, when compe-
titive contracts were introduced by the old sub-regional authority and,
second, when the sub-regional authority started to collaborate with new
municipalities outside of the metropolitan area. However, the quasi-
market is still only a sub-regional market. The Helsinki Metropolitan
Area is one part of the Uusimaa Region and the majority of its 26
municipalities resist the quasi-market model because they consider
Table 5
Some key ratios for bus operators in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area from 1998 to 2014.
(A) Financial ratios (B) Tendering ratios
EBITDA (%) ROE (%) E/A (%) D/E KM BIDDERS
1998 12.8 5.2 41.4 1.4 53.360 4.29
1999 8.6 −21.2 32.8 4.1 70.149 4.29
2000 5.4 −49.2 22.2 7.0 79.520 4.29
2001 7.4 −38.1 22.3 248.9 84.430 4.29
2002 6.3 −42.4 15.3 259.9 83.225 4.00
2003 5.2 −44.5 5.5 254.4 85.000 4.00
2004 4.5 −42.7 −4.3 266.4 83.000 4.00
2005 4.1 −34.9 −19.6 282.5 82.800 3.90
2006 4.6 −30.8 15.4 5.7 83.900 3.80
2007 4.1 −21.5 13.3 6.6 83.600 3.80
2008 1.5 −137.5 9.1 12.7 87.700 3.45
2009 1.9 −77.0 2.1 463.7 88.800 3.10
2010 2.4 −69.8 −0.2 594.7 89.700 3.10
2011 1.7 −71.7 −4.9 645.2 90.799 3.23
2012 4.4 −56.7 −4.5 644.7 92.059 3.35
2013 4.7 −24.0 −2.5 646.9 92.708 3.35
2014 3.2 −48.4 −7.1 640.4 94.529 3.35
Note: EBITDA is earnings from operations before interest, taxes, depreciations, and amortizations divided by net sales; ROE is return on shareholders’ equity [=net
proﬁt margin divided by average equity during the ﬁnancial year]; E/A ratio is balance sheet equity divided by total assets; D/E ratio is balance sheet debt divided
by book value of equity; KM: Number of kilometers (in millions) in tendering bus traﬃc; BIDDERS is the average number of bidders in competitive tendering rounds
between 1998 and 2014.
Table 6
Correlation matrix. The Spearman (Pearson) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.
EBITDA ROE E/A D/E KM BIDDERS
EBITDA 0.718** 0.699** −0.537* −0.598* 0.835**
Sig. 0.001 0.002 0.026 .011 0.000
ROE 0.700** 0.444 −0.502* −0.544* 0.583*
Sig. 0.002 0.074 0.040 0.024 0.014
E/A 0.867** 0.443 −0.843** −0.613** 0.674**
Sig. 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.009 0.003
D/E −0.446 −0.199 −0.634** 0.794** −0.728**
Sig. 0.073 0.444 0.007 0.000 0.002
KM −0.900** −0.546* −0.874** 0.677** −0.815**
Sig. 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.003 0.000
BIDDERS 0.687** 0.561* 0.613** −0.744** −0.718**
Sig. 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.001 0.001
*Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed) and **Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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municipally funded services as expensive. The Finnish Bus and Coach
Association has also strongly opposed the quasi-market becoming re-
gion-wide (Liikennevirasto, 2012). This may have something to do with
the fact that small rural operators have not been able to become es-
tablished in the quasi-market over the years.
We have demonstrated that the introduction of competitive ten-
dering was a temporally critical moment. The closed market’s narrow
opening as only 15 per cent of the inter-municipal services of the me-
tropolitan area was opened through the ﬁrst competitive tendering in
1994 included a governance risk. It caused competition distortion as the
interviewees considered that the gradually phased implementation of
competitive tendering provided an opportunity for operators to use
proﬁts from the negotiated contracts as cross-subsidies supporting very
low bidding prices. This can be considered a governance failure of the
introduction of competitive tendering. However, it can also be con-
cluded that the operators were more interested in competing for market
shares than in striving for proﬁtability objectives. Furthermore, we
found that the tempo of contracting processes has slowed down slightly
during the duration of the quasi-market formation. The original aim of
the sub-regional authority was to use only three- and ﬁve-year con-
tracts, but the currently applied seven-year contracts are more re-
sponsive to the hopes of the incumbent operators.
The new bill proposing the priority position of commercial bus
services over publicly procured urban bus services has provided a legal
challenge to the Helsinki sub-region’s quasi-market. This is an institu-
tional case of competition for a market as the national government aims
to create a new market and implicates a legitimacy problem of the
quasi-market as an exclusive market application in the sub-region. The
The City of Helsinki:
procurement functions
-2009
Separating 
purchasers and
providers
Introducing 
competition
Helsinki didn’t have a coherent vision of how to 
organize its purchasing and providing functions
and it made separation decisions slowly.
Specifying 
collectively 
needed 
services
The sub-regional authority 
of the metropolitan area 
1986-
The city decided to follow the example of the 
sub-regional authority by introducing competitive 
contracts. The settings of the first competitive 
tendering in 1997 were reasonable as all inter-
municipal services based on competition at that 
time. 
The authority didn’t have to perform the purchaser-
provider split as it lacked in-house operators. 
The local authorities didn’t have noteworthy difficulties of defining needed services since they had long 
experience of planning activities and procurements, but they called for slightly different quality documents 
from operators and applied slightly different quality criteria in the early years of the quasi-market. 
The settings of the first competitive tendering in 
1994 were widely considered as a failure since only 
15 per cent of the inter-municipal services were 
tendered while the rest of the contracts based on 
monopoly rights enabling cross-subsidies.  
Deregulation
-since 1991
Helsinki was unprepared for quasi-marketization 
and wasn’t capable of formulating 
a long-term policy on how to manage local bus 
services.
Sharing
risks
Conflicts
between 
principals and 
agents
The authority reviewed clear options for competitive 
tendering and developed a framework of 
competition. A key aim of proposed competitive 
tendering was to make budgetary savings.
The local authorities transferred the risks of cost control to operators via competitive gross contracts, but 
kept back commercial risks. However, the competitive contracts included an index clause taking account of 
staff costs and fuel costs.
As some operators had occasional problems in
performing services because of labour shortages and 
possibly because of some other challenges, the 
authority had to impose contractual penalties and 
increase quality inspections.
The private operators complained via their 
lobbying organization that they cannot get fair 
treatments since the procurement functions of the 
city are too closely connected with the internal 
operator. 
Further 
deregulation
-suggested in 
2016
The authority predicts legal fights over market 
shares, uncoordinated bus services, the 
environmental impacts of pollution, and higher 
ticket prices for unprofitable services.
Unification 
of 
procurement 
policies
The city wanted to merge local and sub-regional 
procurement functions via corporatization. 
Other member municipalities accepted the merger
but rejected the idea of corporatization. The new 
sub-regional authority was created by a new law 
allowing the enlargement of the authority via new 
member municipalities. The procurement and 
transport integration policies became unified in 2010 
via the new single policy making authority. 
Fig. 4. The summarized main phases of the quasi-marketization of the Helsinki area bus services.
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sub-regional authority opposes the bill and claims that pure market-
based services could result in “cream skimming exercises,” where pri-
vate operators would select the most proﬁtable routes and leave un-
proﬁtable bus services for the sub-regional authority (Helsingin Seudun
Liikenne, 2016).
6. Conclusion and policy recommendations
We believe that European economic integration together with
neoliberal tendencies and encouraging international examples of com-
petitive urban bus services created a new public policy framework that
guided Finnish lawmakers to give up the restrictions of foreign own-
ership of enterprises, allow competitive tendering in public transport
services, and introduce rigorous public procurement legislation. In this
connection, the quasi-market concept has to be understood especially as
a transitional and instrumental policy tool for local political decision-
makers to open up a market that had remained eﬀectively closed due to
not only traﬃc licenses and negotiated contracts but also to the
dominant role of in-house production.
The quasi-market format had organizational problems as it could
not provide equal terms of competition between municipal and private
operators, causing an incessant shortage of trust between the private
agents and the municipal principal. The quasi-market has stayed as a
quasi-market purely accidentally in a sense that the privatized muni-
cipal operators were replaced by a state-owned operator that was able
to enter the quasi-market through a corporate acquisition. However,
public authorities have considered the quasi-marketization as a success
story because they could cut down service costs and make the operators
more responsive to their speciﬁc hopes concerning the qualities of buses
and services.
The case demonstrates that public authorities as principals are able
to manage and supervise contracted out services delivered by legally
autonomous agents. In this case, municipal agents were not capable of
competing with private agents, but large private operators took domi-
nant positions at a cost to their proﬁtability as they focused on com-
petition for market shares by bidding with very low prices.
We found that depots are limited but critical resources of the urban
bus industry. City planners should take into account the need for depots
in land use planning and zoning, and city governments should develop
new governance models of the depots together with real estate investors
to promote the easy entries and exits of bus operators. We would also
recommend that the purchasing body should review alternative con-
tractual stipulations, speciﬁcations of the calls for bids, the packages of
routes, the tempos of contracting processes, and alternative quality
checking methods to stimulate innovations and market structures.
If public policymakers decide to quasi-marketize the delivery of a
public service, they should make a clear purchaser-provider split de-
terminedly and quickly. As service producers rightly expect to compete
on equal terms, public policymakers should promote competitive neu-
trality by harmonizing regulatory preconditions, unifying the terms of
collective agreements, and applying well-matched ownership policies.
If municipal service providers are not competitive and are loss-making
organizations, municipalities should radically reorganize or privatize
them quickly. As quasi-marketization may easily cause juxtapositions of
economic interests, municipal councillors and managers should be
prepared for active communication and reconciliation eﬀorts in order
to minimize disruptive industrial disputes between labor market orga-
nizations.
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